Abstract: How does diversity in government impact public good provision? To address this question, we construct a novel dataset linking the ethnicity of California city council candidates to election outcomes and expenditure decisions. We then study how the narrow election of a candidate whose ethnicity differs from the city's modal ethnicity affects expenditure decisions. We find that higher diversity on the council leads to less spending on public goods and fewer votes for affected council members when they run for reelection.
Introduction
Cities in the United States and elsewhere are becoming increasingly ethnically diverse. A growing body of empirical work has considered the political and economic consequences of this increase in diversity, highlighting the possibility for both positive and negative effects.
1 For instance, diversity has been shown to increase productivity, resulting in higher wages and residential values Peri, 2005, 2006) . On the negative side, some have argued that diversity within a city may generate disagreement over the types of public goods government should provide. A consequence of this disagreement is a reduction in the amount the citizenry is willing to be taxed and a low level of government service provision. Empirical work on this front has led to mixed results.
Because it is ultimately a city's government that makes decisions on public spending, we analyze the extent to which diversity within government affects spending.
This contrasts sharply with previous studies, which only consider diversity in the city as a whole. One might argue that the median voter theorem implies that it does not matter whether we explore the impact of the diversity of a city council or the diversity of a city itself. Specifically, the median voter theorem posits that vote-maximizing policymakers in a representative democracy (e.g., a city council) will disregard their own preferences and simply react to the wishes of the median voter. However, numerous theoretical and empirical papers have questioned the validity of the standard median voter model. 2 Consequently, how diversity in government impacts public good provision remains an important and unaddressed question.
The relationship between diversity in government and public spending is theoretically ambiguous. Within a governing body (in this case, the city council) diversity may indeed lead to "gridlock": disagreement over the type of public good to provide and a reduction in spending. However, recent empirical work from a related literature documents that increased representation of a particular group can lead to more spending 1 See Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) for a detailed survey of this literature. 2 See, in particular, Alesina (1988) for theoretical probing of the central implications of the median voter theorem, and Lee, Moretti, and Butler (2004) for an empirical assessment. Elsewhere, researchers have documented a variety of determinants of representative behavior beyond simple response to the preferences of the median voter (Levitt, 1996; Washington, 2008) .
and transfers directed to that group (Pande, 2003; Cascio and Washington, 2014; Bhalotra, Clots-Figueras, Cassan, and Iyer, 2013) . Thus, we might alternatively expect an increase in spending if diversity is accompanied by a greater push to fully serve each represented ethnic group. Some evidence consistent with this is provided by Rugh and Trounstine (2011) . They find that diverse cities are more likely to propose spending packages that bundle public goods, which may be driven by an attempt to satisfy a diverse electorate. This theoretical ambiguity may help explain the mixed results in the existing literature, which has focused only on diversity at the city level.
To examine the relationship between diversity in government and public good spending, we study city councils in California. We construct a novel dataset that identifies the ethnicity of city council members and candidates in California from 2005 to 2011. This is then paired with detailed annual city budgets, obtained from the California State Controller's Office. One advantage to studying within-government diversity is that city council elections naturally lend themselves to a quasi-experimental design. 3 Because council members are elected, we focus on close elections that could potentially shift the diversity of the council (i.e., an election between members of two different ethnic groups). In close elections, the winner is plausibly random and, as a result, so too is the resulting change in diversity. We show that the narrow election of a candidate whose ethnicity is not the city's modal ethnicity is a plausibly exogenous shock to diversity within the city council. The narrow victory is associated with increased diversity within the city council but not at the city level. Relying on this fact, we implement a regression discontinuity design that allows us to measure the extent to which these random shocks to diversity affect spending on public goods. Our results indicate that diversity leads to gridlock; cities reduce the amount they spend on public goods as their city council becomes increasingly diverse. We also find that members of a council that experienced an exogenous shock to diversity receive fewer votes when they run for re-election. This latter point suggests that the city's population is dissatisfied with the decline in public goods, ruling out the possibility that diverse councils simply achieve greater efficiency in public good provision.
These results speak to the existing literature on diversity within a city and public good provision. This literature was essentially started by Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) , who present the theoretical justification for a decline in public good spending, which was noted above. Their model assumes that different ethnicities have different preferences over public goods and that decisions about public goods are made in a twostage election process. In the first stage, the type of public good is determined. In the next stage, the amount of funding for the public good (and therefore the amount citizens will be taxed) is decided. In a median voter framework, greater heterogeneity leads to the adoption of a "compromise" public good. In the next stage of voting, the median voter is not willing to pay high taxes on a public good that is distant from their preferred type. In a homogeneous city, everyone agrees on the type of public good being offered, and the median voter is willing to pay a high tax bill to fund it.
Analyzing a cross section of U.S. cities, Alesina et al. document a (mostly) negative relationship between diversity and public good spending. 4 Recent empirical work has questioned the robustness of this relationship in a panel (Boustan et al., 2013; Hopkins, 2011) or with additional controls (Gisselquist, 2013) . These studies have found no clear and consistent connection between diversity and public good spending. These more recent papers are also of a largely descriptive nature and do not attempt to account for potential endogeneity of diversity. 5 By taking a different angle and exploring the way that diversity in government impacts government spending decisions, we hope to bridge this gap in the literature. Ultimately, our results suggest that even in the context of a small decision-making body, where one might expect favor-trading and an increase in spending, Alesina et al.'s predictions are realized. 4 They find that diverse cities spend less on productive goods (education, roads, and sewerage) but spend more on police protection. Some of their specifications attempt to account for the potential endogeneity of diversity using lagged diversity as an instrument, which yields similar results. 5 It should be noted that Boustan et al. (2013) revisit the relationship between diversity and public good expenditures as a subsection of a paper otherwise addressing a different question.
Our results also speak to a more general literature on the impact of diversity within small groups or organizations, which has been studied in economics, psychology, and human resources. That literature tests competing hypotheses: diversity may lead to disagreement and a decline in performance, or diversity may lead to a variety of skills and ideas, generating improved performance. Results are mixed. In a randomized laboratory experiment, McLeod et al. (1996) find that diverse groups reach solutions to brainstorming tasks that are judged to be of higher quality. Shore et al. (2009) review work mostly from Human Resources researchers. There, the disagreement hypothesis seems to dominate; most of the reviewed research points to a negative relationship between diversity and performance. La Ferrara (2005) studies production cooperatives in Africa. She finds that ethnic diversity leads to lower likelihood of workers specializing in different tasks, perhaps also pointing to an inability to agree and coordinate on the most efficient method of production. Ben-Ner et al. (2014) find some evidence of both effects, potentially reconciling mixed results. Drawing on theories from psychology and elsewhere, they test the idea that diversity can be positive when an organization is threatened and negative when the organizational goal is self-promotion. They test these theories by comparing diversity of soccer players on offense and defense, finding that diversity has a positive impact for defensive players (who are under threat of opposing players' goal scoring) and a negative impact for offensive players (whose "organizational goal" is promotion of the team through goal-scoring.) In this light, it is worth keeping in mind that the production of new public goods may be viewed as a "promotion" task, and that we may be neglecting outcomes wherein diversity of the council has the potential to be positive.
In the next section, we briefly discuss the institutional details of California city councils and elections. In Section 3, we discuss our data, with a particular focus on describing our process of identifying ethnicities of councilmembers and candidates.
Section 4 introduces and validates our empirical approach. Our main result (that diversity reduces spending on public goods) is presented in Section 5.
In Section 6, we analyze the robustness of that result. In Section 7, we show that this increase in diversity hurts the electoral success of councilmembers that serve on the "treated" council, indicating that voters are unhappy with the resulting decline in spending. Section 8 concludes.
City Councils in California
California state law provides a number of guidelines for the institutional structure of municipal governments. Specifically, city councils must contain five councilmembers, and councilmembers are to be elected "at-large" during a general municipal election.
Councilmembers serve staggered four-year terms, with elections every two years.
Elections are nonpartisan, so political party is neither observed to the voters nor is it in our data. California state law defines the mayor as simply another member of the city council and does not provide for any additional powers. In these "council-manager" cities, the council (including the mayor) dictates policy for the city, which is in turn carried out by the city manager. Furthermore, the mayor is typically selected by the city council from amongst its own members.
There are two ways that a city can deviate from the above guidelines. If the city is "general law" -the default form of government for incorporated cities -then it can submit a ballot measure to be approved by the electorate. For "chartered" cities, any deviation must be specified in the city's charter. 6 Chartered cities differ from "general law" cities in one important aspect -chartered cities have supreme authority over all municipal affairs while "general law" cities are bound by the state's general law. The process for adopting, amending, replacing, or repealing a charter is quite involved. Specifically, conditional on receiving signatures from at least 15 percent of registered voters within the city, a city can hold an election that asks voters whether a charter commission should be elected to propose a new charter and which candidates should serve on that commission. Assuming the charter commission is elected, the charter prepared by the commission must then be approved/ratified by voters in the next election. California state law also dictates that the ballot description must enumerate new city powers resulting from the adoption of the new charter. Alternatively, the governing body can motion to propose, amend, replace, or repeal a charter. California state law imposes several requirements aimed at informing the public of the proposed changes, but aside from those provisions, the process for accepting/ratifying those changes is exactly the same. 7 The survey in question is ICMA's 2006 Municipal Form of Government survey, which is the source of all of the statistics in this section.
A city's institutional structure tends to be relatively stable over time. For instance, in the five years preceding the survey fewer than seven percent of cities attempted to alter their form of government. When cities do attempt to alter their form of government, it is typically to switch from at-large to district based elections (or vice versa). Many of these attempts, however, were ultimately unsuccessful.
Data
In this paper, we study the link between city government spending and ethnic diversity within city government. We rely on three broad sources of data to identify: (1) the names and vote totals of individuals who served on a city council or ran for city council but lost; (2) the ethnicities of those councilmembers and candidates; and (3) 
Ethnicities
Because of the importance and novelty of ethnicity-identification in our data, this subsection describes our procedure for collecting these data. We focus our data collection efforts on the intersection of the two California datasets. Hispanic. We also ask the worker to identify the gender of the candidate. Figure 1 provides a screenshot of the task.
We collect ten unique responses for each candidate. There was no limit to the number of photographs a worker could code, but they never observed a candidate more than once. For the sake of incentive compatibility, workers were told that the responses from other workers would be used to judge the accuracy of their work. Specifically, workers were not paid unless a majority of their responses matched the modal response.
Furthermore, because the task is relatively straightforward, the marginal cost from answering truthfully, relative to randomly selecting ethnicity and gender, was small.
We use the modal response as the ethnicity of the candidate if at least five of the ten workers agreed with the modal response. This restriction leaves us with 3,944 identified candidates. The average rate of agreement for these candidates was 94 percent, which implies that on average 9.4 of the ten workers chose the same ethnicity. The average rate of agreement for gender was 99 percent. To assess the accuracy of these responses, we solicited ethnicity information from city clerks and a number of organizations concerned with minority representation. We contacted 450 cities, and of the 230 cities that responded, 96 provided information regarding candidate ethnicity. 
Figure 1: An example task
There is a considerable amount of overlap between these three sources (Amazon's "Mechanical Turk", city responses, and responses from ethnic organizations). Table 1 summarizes the extent to which these sources agree with each other. 271 of the 3,944
ethnicities obtained from the pictures we collected were also listed in the information 
Measuring diversity
To measure diversity we focus on fractionalization and polarization, the most prominent measures used within the literature. Fractionalization is calculated using the following equation:
where ℎ c is the share of the city council in city c during year t that is of ethnicity e.
The fractionalization index ranges from zero to one, where zero implies that all city councilmembers are of the same ethnicity. The polarization index, as proposed by Reynal-Ouerol (2001) , is designed to take into account the potential for group conflict and is measured using the following equation:
e where, as in equation (1), ℎ c is the share of the city council in city c during year t that is of ethnicity e. Similar to fractionalization, the polarization index ranges from zero to one, where zero implies that all councilmembers are of the same ethnicity.
The difference between fractionalization and polarization is best illustrated by the following thought experiment. Suppose that there are five councilmembers of different ethnicities. If the council added a sixth member from yet another ethnic group, fractionalization would increase while polarization would decrease. This is because fractionalization is maximized when each councilmember is of a different ethnicity.
Polarization, on the other hand, is maximized when the seats are distributed into two ethnic groups, leaving the most potential for conflict.
Figure 2 plots the distribution of both indices for our sample, and Table 2 summarizes the ethnic composition of those councils. The typical council has five seats, See text for discussion of how councilmember ethnicities were obtained.
Outcome variables
Our outcome variables are drawn from annual city budgets, which we obtained from the California City Controller's Office. These datasets report detailed expenditure and revenue categories for every city in California. For instance, we observe the amount spent on parks, servicing debts, police, etc. in addition to revenue from various sources (general revenue, intergovernmental revenue, etc.).
Ultimately, we are interested in the impact of diversity on public good spending.
One challenge is that there is substantial variation across cities in the types of public goods offered. To achieve uniform measures of spending across cities, we collapse spending into three broad categories: government administration, debt repayment, and public goods. The government administration and debt repayment categories are provided by the Controller's Office. "Government administration" includes: legislative expenditures, management and support, and all salaries and benefits to workers within either of these categories. "Public goods" is a category of spending we created by taking a city's total expenditures for the year and removing expenditures on "government administration" and debt repayment. The "Public goods" category therefore includes all spending on roads, parks, police protection, sewerage, public transportation, etc. This aggregated measure of public good expenditures provides us with a common measure across all of the cities in our sample.
For the sake of comparison, Table 3 reports summary statistics for all city-year pairs reported in the California Controller dataset and for the city-year pairs where we were able to obtain ethnicity information for all of the city councilmembers. Although the cities with completed councils are slightly larger, ethnic composition and spending patterns across the two samples are similar. Both samples are roughly 50 percent white with city-level fractionalization of about 0.5 and city-level polarization of 0.70.
Furthermore, both samples allocate approximately 86 percent of their revenues to public goods, 13 percent to government administration, and 1 percent to debt repayment. 
Empirical approach

Empirical approach and data
To assess the relationship between diversity and public good spending in our panel of data, we might simply regress spending on fractionalization or polarization (and include city fixed effects). Of course, in doing so, we may be concerned about endogeneity between diversity and spending. For instance, perhaps a city is experiencing a period of growth, with a more diverse population moving in and electing a diverse government. If this is the case, diversity might increase at the same time that spending on public goods increases to accommodate an expanded population, but the increased diversity within government does not necessarily cause the increased spending.
To deal with potential endogeneity, we use close elections with the potential to impact council-level diversity as a source of random variation. 9 Specifically, we implement a regression discontinuity design, focusing on elections between a candidate whose ethnicity differs from the modal ethnicity of the city and a candidate whose ethnicity matches the modal ethnicity. We do so under the assumption that the election of the "non-modal" candidate increases the diversity of the council. This assumption is tested and overwhelmingly confirmed in the next section.
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We restrict our sample to cities that experienced an election between a "modal" The idea of using close elections as a source of random variation in political composition was made famous by Lee et al. (2004) . Recent work analyzing elections in the U.S. House of Representatives (Caughey and Sekhon, 2011; Grimmer et al., 2011) has challenged the validity of this design, showing that winners in close elections tend to have financial, experience, or incumbency advantages, and are often predicted to win. However, Eggers et al. (2014) cast doubt on this claim. Eggers et al. study U.S. House of Representatives in other time periods, as well as statewide, state legislative, and mayoral races in the U.S., and national and local elections in several other countries. In each of these cases, the authors find no evidence that incumbents are more likely to win in a close election. 10 We focus on modal ethnicity because there are many cities without a clear majority group. If a member of a non-modal ethnic group wins when facing off against a member of the modal group, we expect the diversity of the council to increase. 11 For cities that hold district-based elections, each seat is decided by a separate election. Because our empirical strategy requires at most one election for each city-year pair, we use the closest election between two candidates of different ethnicities as the election of interest. 12 The fiscal year runs from July to July.
It is important to note that our outcome variable of interest (within-government diversity) is not binary -the extent to which any candidate affects the diversity of the city council depends both on the candidate's ethnicity and the ethnicity of the other councilmembers. Although using "non-modal win" as an instrument for withingovernment diversity would better accommodate this fact, we focus on the binary treatment variable non-modal wins because it allows us to closely match the approach taken by Gyourko (2009, 2014) in their evaluations of the impact of a Democrat or female mayor being elected. Nevertheless, in Section 5.3 we implement an instrumental variables approach and find similar results.
Before proceeding to our estimating equation, it is important to talk about an issue that requires one final sample restriction. To take advantage of the panel structure of the data, we would like to see government spending before and after an opportunity for treatment. Note, however, that in our panel setup, a city not yet "treated" should not have a margin of victory of zero. Although coding the margin as zero before the election may seem natural, doing so would imply that the counterfactual to a narrow non-modal win is not just a non-modal loss (which is our intention), but also all observations prior to the election. In other words, a city is defined throughout the panel as being a "close election"
city, but the impact of this election is identified only after it is happened.
Of course, setting the "margin of victory" as constant throughout time generates complications if a city experiences more than one election that might cause a shift in diversity. Thus, for some cities, it is necessary to truncate their panel so that each city in our sample only has the potential to be treated once. For the 40 cities in our sample that experience a second election between a modal and non-modal candidate, we truncate their panel, dropping all observations coinciding with and following the year that the second of the potentially treatment-inducing election occurs.
Empirical model
For our analysis, we will estimate variations of the following equation:
where the subscript "c" indicates the city and subscript "t" indicates the year. A candidate is classified as "non-modal" if their ethnicity does not match the modal ethnicity within the city. 13 The variables − c , c , and the interaction of the two mirror the relatively standard parametric regression discontinuity approach. Also note that, as is relatively standard in this approach, margin of victory enters through F(.), which is a polynomial function. When we report results, F(.) will either be a second, third, or fourth-degree polynomial. The dependent variable, c , will capture either: per-capita public good spending, per-capita debt servicing, or per-capita spending on government administration. Standard errors are clustered at the city council level.
"Margin of victory" is simply the difference between the vote share received by the winner and the vote share received by the loser.
14 Because of this, 1 can be interpreted as the impact of a non-modal victory when the margin is zero; in practice, we interpret this as the impact of a victory in a very close election. Thus, the "non-modal wins" coefficient is of primary interest, which can be interpreted as the causal impact of a non-modal victory. Of course, the time invariant nature of "margin of victory" implies that it is ultimately absorbed by the city fixed effects and the coefficient 2 in equation (3) will be omitted.
Empirical approach
Assessing non-modal victory as an exogenous shock to diversity
13 The modal ethnicity within a city is drawn from decennial Census data. Because we do not have yearly data for this variable, we use the modal ethnicity from the midpoint of our sample, 2008. The modal ethnicity in 2008 was calculated by interpolating ethnic shares between the 2000 and 2010 censuses. 14 In elections with "multiple winners" (as in a city council election to fill multiple seats), the margin victory is measured for marginal candidates: the difference between vote share of the lastplaced winner and the first-placed loser.
In this section, we conduct tests to ensure that our research design generates an exogenous shock to diversity. Our first test illustrates that the election of a non-modal candidate increases diversity within the city council but is unrelated to changes in diversity at the city-level. The second test analyzes the distribution of our forcing variable (non-modal win margin) to ensure that a narrowly elected non-modal candidate is indeed an exogenous shock.
Because we use a non-modal win as an increase in council-level diversity, it is important to document that this is the case. We also must be sure that we are not picking up a shift in an important potential confound: a change in diversity within the city. To assess both issues, we estimate specifications following the structure of equation (3), but taking measures of council and city diversity as the outcome variables.
The first and second columns of Table 4 can be thought of as a "first stage,"
documenting that a non-modal victory indeed shocks the diversity of the council.
Regardless of whether we measure diversity with fractionalization (column one) or polarization (column two), there is a strong and positive relationship between the election of a non-modal candidate and the diversity of the city council. To get a sense of the magnitude of the coefficient, consider shifting from a council with four White members and one Hispanic member to a council with three White members and two Hispanic councilmembers. This would change fractionalization from 0.32 to 0.48, which is roughly equivalent to the magnitude observed for the "non-modal" indicator in Table 4 .
Columns three and four can be thought of as a test of an exclusion restriction assumption (if we were using an instrumental-variable approach). Our goal is to test the impact of council-level diversity on public spending. An increase in council diversity that is simply driven by an upward trend in population-level diversity may have its own impact on public spending. 15 But if our "non-modal wins" indicator merely reflects changes in population-level diversity, then our methodology does not represent a random shock to diversity of the decision-makers, and therefore does not represent a methodological improvement over the existing literature. Thus, we regress "non-modal wins" on city-level fractionalization in column three and city-level polarization in column four. Note that city-level fractionalization and polarization are constructed from decennial census data, which means they are interpolated for intercensal years. However, these interpolated measures still allow us to pick up population-level trends. We find that a "non-modal win" is not related to these population-level diversity measures. Note that columns one and two are restricted to city-year pairs where the diversity of all councilmembers is known. Columns three and four do not make this restriction. Robust standard errors (clustered at council-level) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Next, we address a common concern in regression discontinuity designs: the This issue is especially important to our research design. Not only have some questioned the "randomness" near the cutoff when implementing regression discontinuity designs to electoral outcomes (Caughey and Sekhon, 2011; Grimmer et al., 2011) , but Vogl (2014) documents concerns specifically in the context of race and city politics. He finds that in the South, but not the North, there is clear evidence that black mayoral candidates are slightly more likely than white candidates to win a close election.
Here, we have a roughly equal number of observations on either side of the cutoff. This is first documented graphically in Figure 3 . In Figure 3 , we follow McCrary (2008) and plot a discontinuous density function around the cutoff (non-modal margin=0).
Figure 3 is similar to graphs used by Vogl (2014) . 16 The figure demonstrates that the density just to the left of the cutoff is statistically indistinguishable from the density just to the right of the cutoff. We can also document that modal are not more likely to win close elections using simple statistical tests. Ideally, when the election is close, the probability of a non-modal victory should be 0.5. When an election is decided by a margin of 5 percent of less, the observed proportion of non-modal victories is 0.5062. Using a binomial test, this is statistically indistinguishable from 0.5 (the p-value is effectively one).
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Thus, we feel confident that our design yields a shock that (a) is strongly correlated with council-level diversity and (b) is indeed randomly determined. We now proceed to our estimates of the relationship between diversity and government spending.
Main results
Prior to reporting the results from our main regression-discontinuity estimations, it is perhaps informative to start with a simpler fixed-effects regression that does not attempt to deal with endogeneity between diversity and public good spending. These results are reported in Table 5 . As seen in Columns 1 and 4, there is no statistical relationship between diversity and per-capita public goods expenditures. 18 This result is reassuring, as these specifications are close to those of Boustan et al. (2013) and Hopkins (2011) in that they assess the relationship between diversity and public good spending in a panel. As in those papers, there is no clear systematic relationship between the two variables. Similarly, there are no shifts in the amount spent on debt management of government administration. 17 The same holds when we tighten the definition of a "close election". When an election is decided by a margin of 2 percent of less, the observed proportion of non-modal victories is 0.4898. Using a binomial test, this too is statistically indistinguishable from 0.5. 18 Table 5 presents estimates from the sample of city-year pairs where the ethnicity for each councilmember is known. Restricting the sample to the set of cities that ever experience an election between a modal and non-modal candidate produces similar results. Figure 4 presents the first piece of evidence that an increase in the diversity of the governing body decreases expenditures on public goods. In Figure 4 , each city's expenditure categories are collapsed into two periods (before and after an election between a modal and non-modal candidate occurs). We then take the difference between those two periods, which allows us to analyze how average spending on public goods, debt, and government administration evolved following an election between a modal and non-modal candidate. On the x-axis, we organize cities by the non-modal candidate's margin of victory. Note that the margin of victory will be negative if the non-modal candidate lost the election. We then non-parametrically estimate the relationship between "non-modal win margin" and changes in per-capita expenditures. The first line was estimated for non-modal candidate losses (margins less than zero) while the second was estimated for non-modal wins (margins greater than zero). For ease of interpretation, we only display the mean change in expenditures across all elections in one-percent intervals -this is done to avoid displaying 150 observations, which produces a disorderly figure. The first panel of Figure 4 displays the change in per-capita expenditures on public goods. The break between the two lines that occurs at zero (i.e. when the nonmodal candidate was narrowly elected) indicates that per-capita public goods expenditures fell in the years following a non-modal election. 19 It is important to note that this result is obtained without adopting any controls. That is, we are only analyzing a simple difference between pre and post-election expenditures. Notice, however, that as the election becomes less random (i.e. the non-modal candidate wins by a margin of more than ten percent) the change in public goods expenditures returns to zero. This highlights the importance of using quasi-experimental methodology to deal with endogeneity. We repeat this exercise for debt expenditures (second panel) and government administration (third panel), but find no evidence that either of those expenditure categories are affected by an increase in diversity. Table 6 reports the results of our regression discontinuity estimates. We interact the indicator "non-modal wins" with various functional forms for "margin of victory," but these coefficients are not displayed. 20 Ultimately, we find results consistent with the information displayed in Figure 3 . As we saw in the previous section, the election of a non-modal candidate leads to higher diversity on the council. Here we find that this increase in diversity is then associated with a reduction in per-capita public goods expenditures on the order of $150 to $180, depending on whether "margin of victory" is modeled as a second, third, or fourth-degree polynomial. Cities appear to shift their spending away from public good expenditures, which would immediately benefit the population, and towards debt servicing and government administration, but the standard errors on these estimates are large. These results are most consistent with the Alesina et al. (1999) argument that diversity in a group generates disagreement over public goods, which in turn implies a reduction in the willingness to spend. Table 6 documents that a close non-modal victory has a negative impact on public good spending. Keep in mind, though, that we use "non-modal" wins as a reduced form proxy for an increase in continuous measures of diversity (fractionalization and polarization). Before proceeding to some additional probing of our main result, we aim to document that the results in Table 6 are driven by a change in continuous diversity measures. In this section we adopt an instrumental variables strategy that essentially uses the regression-discontinuity approach as an instrument for diversity (as measured by fractionalization or polarization), and then estimate the impact of predicted diversity (i.e.
An instrumental variables approach
predicted fractionalization or predicted polarization) on government spending.
Specifically, we estimate the following equations:
First stage:
Second stage:
where the first stage mirrors the standard parametric regression-discontinuity approach used in equation (3) and c will either reflect the degree of fractionalization or polarization within city council c at year t. As in the previous section, e will capture either: per-capita public good spending, per-capita debt servicing, or per-capita spending on government administration. Standard errors are clustered at the city council level. Table 7 reports our second-stage results for each of the three major expenditure categories.
21 Again, we find that greater diversity in the council generates a significant reduction in the per-capita spending on public goods. To interpret this coefficient, note that the election of a non-white to a five-person and all-white council would increase fractionalization from 0 to 0.4. If this were the case, our results suggest that per-capita spending on public goods would decline by approximately $842. This is essentially an upper bound on the tangible impact of our results, as the election of a non-white to an otherwise all-white council is the largest possible marginal change in fractionalization. 
Additional results
In the previous section, we showed that the election of a candidate whose ethnicity differs from that of the modal ethnicity increases the diversity of the city council. Moreover, we found that increase in diversity to result in less spending on public goods. Having documented our main result (and the fact that the fall in public goods spending operates through a change in the continuous diversity measures), we now further consider the robustness of these results.
First, in the previous section we collapsed a number of areas of spending into one broad "public good" category. This was done largely because cities, especially in California, vary in the public goods they do or do not provide. 22 Thus, collapsing into a single "public good spending" measure allows for a uniform treatment of cities in the sample. There is some question, though, as to whether our documented result is truly a decline in public good spending generally, or whether it is driven by one specific category. In Table 8 we unbundle public goods expenditures to analyze the impact of diversity on the following expenditure categories: community development, culture and leisure, health, public safety, and public transit. As in Table 6 , we only report the coefficient for "non-modal wins" and each row reports this coefficient from a regression that models "margin of victory" as either a second, third, or fourth degree polynomial.
Although the standard errors are larger than in our main results, the results are consistently negative for all categories of public goods. 22 It is common for cities to make contracts with private entities or other governments (either a nearby city or the county) to provide some services. Next, we consider whether our results are driven by diversity per se, or whether they are driven by a change in minority representation. This requires further probing, as it is true that a "non-modal" candidate will often be an ethnic minority. The empirical finding would be of interest either way, but our hypothesized mechanism (disagreement driven by multiple opinions on the council, leading to a decline in spending) is most plausible if the result is driven by diversity. To ensure that these results are not simply driven by the occasional election of a minority in an otherwise mostly-white council, we drop all situations where white is the modal race. This leaves us with 323 council-year pairs. Again, we find a large and statistically significant decrease in per-capita public good expenditures resulting from the election of a "non-modal" candidate. The results presented in Table 9 indicate that our earlier findings are not being driven by the election of a minority to a mostly white council. For these cities, however, it appears that the election of a non-modal candidate also reduces expenditures on government administration. In a related test, we examine the interaction between our result and the diversity of the city. By partitioning our sample, we address the question of whether a more diverse council reduces spending only when they represent a relatively homogenous city.
In Table 10 , we partition the sample by city-level diversity. Specifically, we estimate equation (5) using a third order polynomial for on two samplesthose with city-level fractionalization less than the median level of city-fractionalization within the sample (0.57) and those with city-level fractionalization greater than the median. Whether the diversity of the city is above or below the median, the election of a non-modal candidate has (statistically) the same affect on public goods expenditures.
Interestingly, it appears that spending on government administration falls in less diverse cities while spending on debt servicing falls for more diverse cities. data correspond to the first year that the non-modal candidate could potentially impact the budget. The variable is set to one afterwards. It is important to note that our panel is relatively short, and so for most of the sample "After 1 st year" simply implies "in the second year". Estimates interacting "Non-modal wins" with "After 1 st year" are presented in Table 11 . Keeping in mind that the impact of "Non-modal wins" and "Non-modal wins * After 1 st year" are additive, we find no evidence of a reversal of the gridlock effect. If anything, public good spending falls even more as the non-modal candidate becomes more established within the council. 
Council performance as measured by electoral success in subsequent elections
Thus far, we have seen that diversity in a city council leads to a reduction in spending on public goods. This result is consistent with the argument that more diversity within a council leads to disagreement and "gridlock." However, there are of course other explanations. For instance, it could be that spending falls because a diverse council finds ways to provide the same public goods more efficiently, which would be a positive outcome for the city.
Thus, to assess whether the decline in spending is driven by a decline in city council performance (e.g., inaction due to an inability to agree on public good provision),
we would like to measure whether the populace suffers. To get some sense of this, we turn to a measure of voter satisfaction: the electoral success of city council members in the next election that they face. That is, we observe that a council in City A experienced a shock to diversity, while a council in City B did not. We also observe the election returns for all members of City A's council and City B's council when they run for re-election (if they do so). In this section, we examine whether the share of the vote received by City A incumbents suffers relative to City B incumbents as a result of the shock to diversity.
We again employ a regression-discontinuity approach, taking the election of a non-modal candidate as a shock to diversity. Here, the unit of analysis is the council member, and the outcome variable is that council member's share of the vote. The data are setup as a panel where we observe each candidate's vote share twice. The first vote share comes from the election that brought them into office and the second vote share comes from the election following the potentially treatment-inducing election. This allows us to control for candidate ability by including candidate fixed effects. Because the number of candidates in the race mechanically impacts vote share, we include indicator variables that account for the number of candidates seeking election. As before,
we also include year fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the council level.
Results are reported in Table 12 . Columns 1, 2, and 3 report the same specification using second, third, and fourth degree polynomials respectively. In all specifications, there is evidence that voters are less likely to re-elect a councilmember who experienced an exogenous increase in diversity. The vote share for a treated councilmember drops by between 3 and 5 percentage points (albeit with some lost precision in the fourth-degree polynomial specification.) Based on these results, it seems that the decline in public good spending is indeed an outcome that is viewed as dissatisfactory to voters. 
Conclusion
We analyze the relationship between ethnic diversity and public good provision by constructing a novel dataset linking the ethnicity of city councilmembers to election outcomes and expenditure decisions. This allows us to exploit close elections as a source of random variation in the ethnic composition of a city council. We first show that the narrow election of a candidate whose ethnicity is not the city's modal ethnicity is a plausibly exogenous shock to diversity within the city council. More precisely, the election of a non-modal candidate is associated with an increase in diversity at the government level but does not affect diversity at the city level. We then implement a regression discontinuity design, which allows us explore how this increase in diversity affects the provision of public goods.
Results indicate that increases in diversity lead to gridlock; cities reduce the amount they spend on public goods. These results hold whether we analyze public goods as one broad category or consider each underlying category (health, public safety, roads, etc.) individually. We show that these results are not simply driven by the election of minorities in mostly white cities. It is also not the case that within government diversity only reduces public spending for relatively homogenous cities. Lastly, we find no evidence to suggest that this effect disappears over time, which indicates that cities are not circumventing disagreement through the use of logrolling and favor trading.
These results reconcile a debate within the literature. Some have argued that increases in diversity will lead to disagreement over the type of public good provided and a reduction in spending, what we call the "gridlock" hypothesis. Empirical support for this claim is mixed, but previous studies focus on diversity within the city. This makes it difficult to identify a source of quasi-random variation, but more importantly, focusing on within-city diversity ignores the fact that diversity is filtered through the political process.
Recent empirical work questioning the validity of the median voter theorem in a representative democracy indicates that the diversity of the governing body might be a more appropriate unit of analysis. Furthermore, if the median voter theorem does not hold, theoretical ambiguity as to how diversity affects decision-making in a small-group setting might explain the mixed results in the previous literature. For these reasons, we analyze the important yet unexplored question of how diversity within government affects public good provision.
Consistent with Boustan et al. (2013) and Hopkins (2011) we find that a simple fixed-effects analysis reveals no statistical relationship between ethnic diversity and public goods expenditures. However, the true relationship may be confounded. For instance, it could be the case that as a city becomes increasingly diverse and elects a diverse government, it also experiences population growth that requires an increase in infrastructure investment. In this case, the increase in public good expenditures resulting from population growth might confound the effects of diversity. Our empirical strategy, which is not subject to these same critiques, indicates that diversity does in fact reduce public good expenditures, which is consistent with the argument laid out in Alesina et al. (1999) .
As cities in the United States and elsewhere become increasingly diverse it is important to understand the consequences of that diversity. In this paper, we have shown that diversity reduces spending. Taking this result seriously, this might provide a new dimension to consider when assessing the optimal balance between centralized and decentralized government. 24 It may be that state government is less diverse and perhaps better equipped to overcome gridlock. The reverse may hold as well.
That withstanding, we should add several caveats to the interpretation of our main result. Although spending falls, we are unable to say anything about actual provision of the public good. As noted, it is at least possible that spending falls because government is cutting wasteful or inefficient spending Our results on subsequent electoral success of members of diverse councils suggest that this is not the case. It could be the case, however, that spending falls for services not valued by those from previously underrepresented groups. To better assess the welfare implications of this fall in spending, future research should find group-specific outcomes to assess whether, certain groups disproportionately benefit or suffer. Data on consumption or enjoyment of publicly provided services, for instance, would allow future researchers to more fully address both of these issues.
